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The neO theory o f  motivation by Atkinson and Birch (1970), based on 
conceptual analysis o f  a change in activity, has been programmed to allow 
computer simulation o f  effects o f  differences in motivation on the stream o f  
operant behavior. Simulation o f  conditions that exist when people who 
differ in strength o f  achievement motive write imaginative stories in 
response to a sequence o f  pictures shows that construct validity does not 
require internal consistency as traditionally supposed. The theoretically 
deduced differences in total time spent imagining achieving (instead o f  
something else) can postdict input differences in motive strength (i.e., 
construct validity) even when there is little or no internal consistency 
reliability as indicated by Cronbach "s (1951) alpha computed from theoreti- 
cally deduced time spent imagining achievement in response to particular 
pictures. This general point has" already been amply documented in 25 years 
o f  productive empMcal research using TAT  n Achievement. Now a defini- 
tive theoretical refutation o f  the repeated psychometric criticism o f  the 
method is provided. Those who have been moved "'to dispel fantasies about 
fantasy-based measures o f  achievement motivation" (Entwistle, 1972) are 
invited, instead, to examine the shallow theoretical foundation of  our tradi- 
tional myths o f  measurement. 
~This paper elaborates a report presented August 30, 1975, at the 83rd annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association. The authors gratefully acknowledge early assistance by 
Mary M. Moffett, and financial support by a Rackham Faculty Research Grant (JWA), a 
National Science Foundation Fellowship (KB), and a Michigan Student Medical Research 
Grant (LHP). Intricate detail has been avoided in describing the several simulations for the 
sake of clarity Jn this overview of exploratory work. 
2Queries about detail and requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. John W. Atkinson, De- 
partment of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104. 
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Systematic study of the behavioral effects of individual differences in 
achievement motivation has employed an experimentally validated method 
of measurement for a little over quarter of a century (McClelland, Atkin- 
son, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). It has taken this long for the sustained 
program of research to reach a point in its theoretical development that 
allows a definitive reply to the frequent criticism that thematic apperceptive 
measures of n Achievement and other social motives (e.g., n Affiliation, n 
Power) cannot possibly be valid because they have such low internal con- 
sistency reliability. Our primary aim is to answer this criticism and to throw 
new light on the method of inferring motivational differences from content 
analysis of operant imaginative behavior emitted in the presence of pictures. 
This so-called projective technique is known as thematic apperception 
(Morgan & Murray, 1935). Some consider it no more than a vestige of an 
earlier era that was more tolerant of clinical intuition and general looseness 
in the study of personality and human motivation. We, among others who 
have taken a different view, are now more encouraged than ever concerning 
the promise of disciplined experimental and conceptual analysis of imagina- 
tive thought content. It is one of the virtually untapped resources for future 
development of the behavioral science of an animal distinguished by its 
unique competence for conceptual thought and language. This is much 
easier to say today, in an era generally characterized by a resurgence of 
interest in cognitive phenomena, than it was in the earlier heyday of S -R  
behavior theory (e.g., McClelland, 1955). 
Of all the criticisms of empirical research on n Achievement and 
behavior that have appeared repeatedly over the years (most of which have 
been adequately answered if one knows the mainstream of the work), the 
argument voiced again most recently by Entwistle (1972), that inadequate 
internal consistency reliability puts a lid on any claims for the validity of a 
thematic apperceptive measure, has probably produced the most persistent 
skepticism regarding the scientific credibility of the method and of the 
results of the research program in which it has provided the integrative 
thread. By now that program of research has become a rather vast one, 
embracing other social motives and invading sociology, education, and 
industry, and extending into content analysis of literature to diagnose moti- 
vation in historical and comparative societal studies (e.g., McClelland et al., 
1953; Atkinson, 1958; McClelland, 1961; Atkinson &Feather, 1966; Heck- 
hausen, 1963; 1967; McClelland & Winter, 1969; Smith, 1969; Veroff & 
Feld, 1970; McClelland, Davis, Kahn, & Wanner, 1972; Atkinson & 
Raynor, 1974; Winter, 1973; Weiner, 1974). 
True believers of classical test theory assert that reliability is the sine 
qua non of validity. To refute this assertion, we shall review what we are 
now learning about the psychometric properties of thematic apperception 
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when a theory of motivation, instead of classical test theory, serves as the 
model of human behavior. The question of interest is: what happens when 
we simulate the conditions that exist when people who differ in strength of 
achievement motive, for example, are confronted with a series of pictures, 
each of which provides an occasion for emission of an imaginative story? It 
has become possible to do this because the conception of motivation 
evolved using TAT n Achievement in the face of chronic skepticism culmi- 
nated in a reconstruction of the theory of motivation by Atkinson and Birch 
(1970). This development followed a landmark study of persistence in 
achievement-oriented action by Feather 0962) and recognition of its more 
general theoretical implications (Atkinson & Cartwright, 1964; Atkinson, 
1964, pp. 298-314). 
The new theory of motivation, the dynamics of action, recovers the 
basic empirical facts about effects of individual differences in achievement 
motivation on behavior (Atkinson & Birch, 1974) and well-known empirical 
generalizations about the subsequent motivational effects of reward and 
punishment. A computer program for the theory was initiated by Seltzer 
(1973) and is constantly being extended and refined (Seltzer & Sawusch, 
1974; Bongort, 1974). So now we are able to undertake computer simula- 
tion of the effects of differential motivation on the stream of operant 
behavior under complex conditions (e.g., Atkinson & Birch, 1974), 
including now the stream of imaginative behavior that constitutes a 
thematic apperceptive test. In our work at Michigan, we are in the midst of 
computer-simulation analysis of problems that were literally unthinkable a 
decade ago. For example, Birch, Atkinson, and Bongort (1974) have 
recently demonstrated how the content of  thought can control voluntary 
action without any prompting of the thought from the immediate environ- 
ment or stimulus situation. 
Given a computer program that is the theory of motivation, we can 
turn that theory around on the method of measurement used in the empiri- 
cal research over the years to provide the main source of most of the infer- 
ences that guided construction of the theory. It comes as no great surprise to 
us that a coherent theory of motivation evolved in the course of using 
thematic apperception to study and explain behavioral expressions of 
individual differences in motivation should also finally explain the stream 
of imaginative behavior that constitutes the standard and controversial 
measuring instrument. We already have that model in physics. The theory 
of heat explains the behavior of mercury in a thermometer. 
To date, our 25 computer simulations of thematic apperception have 
produced this rather unambiguous and important conclusion: the construct 
validity o f  thematic appetveptive measures does not require internal con- 
sistency reliability as supposed by traditional test theory. The theoretically 
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deduced differences in the total amount of  time various people will spend 
imagining achieving (instead of  something else), on the occasion of  being 
presented with a set of pictures, can postdict, with substantial accuracy, the 
differences in strength of motive that were fed as input to the computer 
among the antecedent conditions. This is so even when there is no internal 
consistency reliability as indicated by the coefficient alpha (c0 (Cronbach, 
1951), calculated from the theoretically deduced time spent imagining 
achieving in response to each of  the several pictures in the simulated 
thematic apperceptive test. This means, very simply, that experimental re- 
search on human motivation, and conceptual analysis of  motivation based 
on that research, has produced an alternative logic to substitute for the 
traditional a priori logic of  test theory based on elaboration of  the implica- 
tions of the normal curve of distribution concerning what happens from 
moment to moment in the temporal period of a TAT. We present, to 
reiterate, an alternative to traditional test theory as the theoretical 
foundation of thematic apperceptionma "psychologically" grounded 
theory as distinct from a "statistically" grounded theory. 
Perhaps having the conclusion first will encourage broader interest in 
this new theory of  motivation and a computer program for it, both of  which 
are included in Atkinson and Raynor 's  Motivation and Achievement 
(1974), the most recent progress report of the program of  research at 
Michigan. 
THE DYNAMICS OF ACTION 
The new conception, the dynamics of action, breaks with the tradi- 
tional mode of thought that has always considered behavioral episodes as 
isolated events. It begins with a new premise: that an individual is already 
active in two senses before being exposed to the traditional stimulus situa- 
tion that in the past has always been assumed to be needed to get things 
started. First, the individual is already doing something when a scientific 
observer initially takes notice. Second, the individual is already actively 
motivated to do many other things before the stimulus situation of  tradi- 
tional interest occurs. This was one of  Freud's great insights: that wishes, 
inclinations, or tendencies, once aroused--whenever--persist  until ex- 
pressed in behavior directly or substitutively, long past the time of  direct 
exposure to their initial instigating stimulus. And it is the idea that Hebb 
(1949) elaborated in calling attention to the sensory dominance of  tradi- 
tional psychological theory that is incompatible with what is known about 
an already active brain. 
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This means, in effect, that we have broken out of the traditional 
S - O - R  mode of thought that considers behavioral episodes as separate, 
independent, isolated events. We now view the behavioral life of an indi- 
vidual as a continual stream (Barker's concept, 1963) that is characterized 
by change from one activity to another, even in a constant environment. 
The emphasis shifts from analysis of the initiation, instrumental striving, 
and termination of isolated activities to analysis of the continuity of 
behavior and the continuity o f  its underlying motivational structure as we 
focus attention on the joint or juncture between activities, a change from 
one to another (Birch, 1968, 1972; Atkinson, 1969). 
In The Dynamics o f  Action (Atkinson & Birch, 1970, 1974), we 
conceive the impact on behavior of the immediate environment (or stimulus 
situation) to be the various instigating and inhibitory forces it produces. 
These influence the rate of arousal of an individual's tendencies to engage 
or not to engage in certain activities, including imaginative activities. 
If a certain kind of activity has been intrinsically satisfying or pre- 
viously rewarded in a particular situation, there will be an instigating force 
(F) for that activity, attributable in part to strength of motive in the person 
and in part to the magnitude of incentive for that activity in that situation. 
This will cause a more or less rapid arousal and increase in the strength of 
an inclination to engage in that activity, an action tendency (T), depending 
on the magnitude of the force. If a certain kind of activity has been 
frustrated or punished in the past, there will be an inhibitory force (I) and a 
more or less rapid growth in the strength of a disinclination to act. This is 
what we now call a negaction tendency (N) and conceive as a tendency not 
to do it. The duration of these forces will determine how strong the action 
tendency or negaction tendency becomes. The latter, the tendency not to do 
something, will produce resistance to the activity. It opposes, blocks, 
dampens; that is, it subtracts from the action tendency to determine the 
resultant action tendency (T = T-N) .  The resultant action tendency 
competes with resultant action tendencies for other incompatible activities. 
The strongest of them is expressed in behavior. The expression of an action 
tendency in behavior is what reduces it. Engaging in activity produces a 
consummatory force (C), which depends in part on the consummatory 
value (c) of the particular activity and in part on the strength of tendency 
being expressed in the activity (i.e., C = eT). Similarly, the resistance to an 
action tendency, produced by the opposition of a negaction tendency, 
constitutes an analogous force o f  resistance (R), which reduces, in a com- 
parable way, the strength of the negaction tendency. The basic concepts are 
presented in Table I. 
This, very briefly, outlines our conception of the causal factors 
involved in the continuous rise and decline in strength of tendencies 
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Table I. Analogous Concepts in the Treatment of 
Instigation of Action and Resistance to Action a 
Instigation of action Resistance to action 
Instigating force, F Inhibitory force, I 
Action tendency, T Negaction tendency, N 
Action Resistance 
Consummatory force, C Force of resistance, R 
aFrom Atkinson and Birch (1970, p. 207). 
illustrated in Figure 1. The changes in strength of  competing motivational 
tendencies in turn account for the changes from one activity to another (x, 
y, z in the behavioral stream of Figure 1) and the particular sequence of 
activities that characterizes an individual's behavior, even in a constant 
environment. 
Thematic Apperception 
This sort of  thing happens when a person is confronted with a partic- 
ular picture in a thematic apperceptive test and asked to write an imagina- 
tive story. Figure 1 is one of  our earliest computer simulations of  what 
should be expected to happen if an individual were exposed to three 
i | | , Z  t i Y | , ~ :  Y | X X Y 
X X X z ,x,Y .x 
I | , ; • . • . .  
i ,n 
TIME 
Fig. 1. An example of  a stream of  activity (x, y, z) and the systematic changes in 
strength of tendencies that produced it. Based on Seltzer (1973) and Birch et al. 
(1974). 
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instigating forces of different magnitudes with different consummatory 
values for these incompatible activities in the same environment for a period 
of time (Seltzer, 1973). One may therefore consider this a simple instance of 
the kind of thing that happens in our computer simulations of thematic 
apperception, except that the strength of the several motivational tendencies 
one sees would carry over and constitute the initial strength of those moti- 
vational tendencies when the person is immediately exposed to the next 
stimulus situation, or picture. It will produce forces that may differ in both 
kind and strength from those of the first picture, and so on. 
The basic concepts of the dynamics of action presented in Table I 
should not seem totally unfamiliar to those acquainted with earlier theory 
of achievement motivation (Atkinson & Feather, 1966). In the framework 
of the new dynamics of action, the theory of achievement motivation--as 
recently elaborated and generalized by Raynor (1969, 1974)--is now to be 
considered a theory about the determinants of instigating forces to achieve 
success (Fs) and inhibitory forces to avoid failure (IF) in various activities 
and not, as was heretofore assumed, about the determinants of the final 
strength of the tendencies to achieve success (Ts) and to avoid failure (NF) 
in a particular situation. 
We have made the same general distinction between the arousability 
(or rate of arousal) of a tendency, calling it the magnitude of force (F), and 
the level of arousal or strength of that tendency at a particular time (T) that 
Whalen (1966) proposed in an analysis of sexual motivation, 
Considerations of both space and just how far along we are in 
computer simulations of operant behavior argue for limiting the present 
discussion to the fate of positive motivational tendencies. So we shall ignore 
inhibitory force, negaction tendencies, and resistance to action in further 
discussion, though the theory and its computer program do not. Systematic 
study of the effect of resistance on thematic apperception is already under 
way. We cannot conceive of the possibility that this further complication 
will change the conclusion, already stated, based on even more simple 
conditions. 
The Integrative Principle of  a Change in Activity 
A single and fairly simple principle of change in activity has emerged 
in our analysis of the question of what is required in a theory to explain a 
simple change of activity. Several such changes are shown in Figure 2 (un- 
complicated by inhibitory force, negaction tendency, and resistance). 
What causes the change(s) in motivation implied by the observed 
change in activity in a constant environment? Why does the person stop 
writing about sex and start writing about achievement? 
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Fig. 2. Various ways in which a change in relative strength of two ten- 
dencies (T A and TB) can come about during an interval of time (t). 
From Atkinson and Birch (1970, 1974). 
We began very conservatively, eschewing the idea that action 
tendencies change in strength spontaneously by mere random oscillation 
from moment to moment (as presumed in traditional theories). Freud 
argued that the wish persists until it is expressed. We sharpen that language 
somewhat. A behavioral tendency, once aroused, will persist in its present 
state until acted upon by some psychological force that either increases or 
decreases its strength. This explains why all the tendencies in the graphs of 
Figure 2 have some initial (or inertial) strength above zero at the beginning 
of the interval of observation. The person is active, already doing some- 
thing (activity A) corresponding to the strongest tendency, and is already 
actively motivated to do something else (activity B) and certainly many 
other activities, should we care to complicate both our graphs and introduc- 
tory discussion with a larger number of  initially subordinate tendencies. 
The algebraic statement of  the principle of  a change in activity says 
simply what the several graphs show. A subordinate tendency will become 
dominant and a change in activity will occur at a certain time, depending on 
the initial strength of the subordinate tendency (TBi); the magnitude of 
instigating force controlling the rate of arousal or further growth in its 
strength (FB), which is attributable in part to strength of motive in the 
person and in part to the magnitude of incentive in the immediate environ- 
ment; the strength of the dominant initial tendency (TA) as it is affected by 
its instigating force (FA) and the consummatory force of the activity being 
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expressed, which derives in part from the consummatory value (CA) of that 
activity; and, finally, the duration of exposure (t) to these several forces. 
The mathematical statement of the principle (ignoring resistance), account- 




, o f t  - 
FB FB 
when the ongoing activity has approached the limit of its strength (FA/cA) 
in that situation (see Atkinson & Birch, 1970, Ch. 1; 1974). 
Elaboration of the implications of the mathematical statement of the 
principle and its application to explanation of a sequence of changes in a 
stream of behavior (Birch, 1972) has yielded hypotheses about how the 
magnitude of instigating force (and therefore strength of motive, one of its 
determinants) will influence the initiation of an activity (i.e., latency of 
response), choice among alternatives, the duration or persistence of a 
particular activity, the proportion of total time spent in a given activity, the 
relative frequency of activities, and the operant level or rate of an activity in 
a given environment. 
The dynamics of action purports to be a theory of operant behavior. 
And it provides the integrative logic or theoretical basis for expecting 
relationships among various measurable aspects of an activity in the study 
of personality. 
The Stream of Behavior 
In going beyond a simple change in activity to analysis of a sequence 
of changes in the stream of behavior, we have assumed that there is a 
temporal lag in the onset and cessation of the full consummatory force of 
an activity when a change occurs (Atkinson & Birch, 1970, pp. 96-101). The 
parameters of the lag in our computer programs are its duration and the 
shape of the ogive-like function that defines the rate of growth to, or decline 
from, full consummatory force during this interval. 
In addition, we have found it meaningful to allow for a certain degree 
of selectivity in attention to the various cues (or discriminative stimuli) that 
are the sources of instigating forces for various activities (Atkinson & Birch, 
1970, pp. 92-96). It is generally assumed that an individual will be system- 
atically (i.e., constantly) exposed to instigating force for the activity that is 
occurring. But the degree of attention (or exposure) to cues that produce 
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instigating forces that influence subordinate tendencies is another parame- 
ter of interest in simulation of streams of behavior. 
COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THEMATIC APPERCEPTION 
The mathematical elaboration of the theory for the simple case of two 
alternative activities suggested to Sawusch (1974) that the proportion of 
time spent in a given kind of activity, when there were many competing 
alternatives, would equal the ratio of the asymptotic strength of  the critical 
tendency to the sum of the asymptotic strengths of all the competing action 
tendencies in that situation. It could not be proved mathematically, but it 
was nicely demonstrated in a series of computer simulations of streams of 
behavior that varied the magnitude of  instigating force and consummatory 
value of the critical activity against a constant context of competing alterna- 
tives, as shown in Figure 3. The dashed-line curves represent the theoreti- 
caUy expected proportion of time spent in the critical activity; the points 
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Fig. 3. Correspondence o f  simulated ( , )  and theoretical ( - - )  percentage time spent in critical 
activity . . . .  A assuming percentage time in A equals ratio of  FA/CA to .FA/C A + FB/C .  + 
Fn/c n m that environment.  (The simulation approximates the 1deal case in not assuming selec- 
tive attention and in minimizing effects o f  consummatory lags [interval = 1.0, ~ = .8]. There 
are three competing alternatives, each having F = 8, c = .08, F/c = 100. Based on last 900 of  
time interval of  1000.) 
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represent the results for particular situations that were simulated. The fit is 
exact for our approximation of the ideal case, and it was exact when we 
varied the context provided by number and strength of competing alter- 
natives. 
It is a small step to ask: How long will the tendency to achieve be 
dominant and expressed in imaginative activity if the environmental 
stimulus, a TAT picture, produces instigating forces for a number of 
competing activities and the strength of motive to achieve (which influences 
the strength of instigating force to achieve) differs among a number of 
individuals? Then what wilt happen if, after an arbitrary interval of 100 
units of time (corresponding to a 4-rain story), we immediately confront 
these individuals, who differ in strength of motive, with a new picture that 
presents either more or less incentive to achieve than the first one and varia- 
tion in the incentives that influence the competing tendencies? (We assume, 
as generally, that strength of motive and magnitude of incentive combine 
multiplicatively to determine magnitude of instigating force.) What 
happens if we continue to present a new TAT card, with a new pattern of 
instigating forces, every I00 time units? 
This has been the pattern of 25 computer simulations involving, in 
each case, 18-30 hypothetical subjects who differ in strength of achieve- 
ment motive. We have presented our simulated TAT pictures in Latin 
Square designs, following the procedure of the first study of internal con- 
sistency of n Achievement by Atkinson (1950), reported in McClelland et al. 
(1953, Ch. 7), and in a fixed order, following a fixed pattern of strongly and 
weakly cued pictures established by Haber and Alpert (1958). Both of these 
early studies had indicated enough internal consistency, even given conven- 
tional test theory, to justify research classifying subjects at the median or 
into thirds according to motive strength. So, for comparability with 
empirical data, we have classified subjects into thirds, according to compu- 
ter input strength of motive, in our analysis of simulated results even when 
individual differences in motive were sampled from a distribution of mag- 
nitudes. 
The computer program applies the principle of a change in activity 
given the strengths of a set of competing tendencies in the individual and 
forces produced by the first picture. Then, at the end of 100 time units, it 
applies the principle again, but now with a different set of forces operating 
on tendencies that have changed in strength and carry over from the end of 
one story to the beginning of the next, and so on. Here, instead of assuming 
isolated and completely independent tests, or behavioral episodes, the new 
theory emphasizes the continuity that characterizes both the stream of 
motivation and of behavior in real life. 
At the end of each 100 units of time, the computer printout tells us 
how much time was spent imagining achievement and each of the other 
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kinds of competing activities. By treating simulated time spent thinking 
about achievement as the theoretically expected or true n Achievement score 
(as if we had an empirical measure that corresponded to a perfect clock), we 
can compute the theoretically expected average split-half reliability, Cron- 
bach's ~, treating each story as a separate test or item, as, for example, 
Entwistle (1972) did. In addition, we can determine construct validity of the 
theoretically expected total time spent thinking about achievement in the set 
of four, five, or six stories by seeing how accurately this total time postdicts 
the differences in strength of achievement motive (High, Mid, and Low 
thirds) that were fed into the computer as input descriptive of our 
hypothetical subjects. The reader is reminded that the theory represented by 
the computer program was not constructed to explain thematic apperceptive 
n Achievement but to explain behavioral phenomena related to individual 
differences in TA T  n Achievement and other more generally known 
behavioral facts. 
In a review of quite a number of empirical studies, Entwistle (1972) 
concluded that the Cronbach a for TAT n Achievement scores must gener- 
ally fall between .35 and .40--values rather too modest, given traditional 
test theory, to justify any "fantasies about fantasy-based measures of 
achievement motivation." We must keep in mind that these as, obtained in 
actual empirical studies, are degraded versions of what a perfect clock 
would tell because n Achievement score, at best, is a rough index of time 
spent, how rough depending a good deal on the scoring reliability or skill of 
the investigator, which is too often, we know, very modest. Our data, here, 
represent time as measured by a nearly perfect clock. 
The very first computer simulation of a TAT (Moffett, 1974) utilized 
a balanced Latin Square design with five different pictures, ten orders of 
presentation, for 30 hypothetical subjects who were High, Moderate, or 
Low in strength of achievement motive. The theoretically deduced time 
spent imagining achievement on each of five stories and total time for 
subjects rank-ordered by thirds on strength of motive, taken from the com- 
puter printout of the simulated event, are shown in Table II. 
Here, with all other parameters of the theory held constant for each of 
the 30 subjects, including those influencing three activities incompatible 
with "achieving," the Cronbach a (internal consistency) based on time per 
story by picture was only .08; yet 87°7o of the subjects were correctly ordered 
into High, Mid, and Low thirds on motive strength in terms of the total 
t{me spent "achieving" in all five stories. One would expect 33% to be 
correctly placed by chance. 
This earliest effort reproduced a number of other phenomena well 
known to those familiar with the literature on TAT n Achievement. Under 
certain limited conditions, there was an odd-even oscillation in mean time 
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Table I1. Theoretically Deduced Time Spent Thinking about Achievement in First 
Computer Simulation of Thematic Apperception Involving Five Pictures in Balanced 
Latin Square Design a 
Simulated time spent "achieving" 
Motive strength By picture By order 
(defined by 
computer Subject Stories Stories Total 5 
input) No. A B C D E 1 and 2 4 and 5 stories 
High 1 13 10 18 22 25 23~ 40 88 
(t.5) 2 14 20 17 20 24 37 44 95 
3 5 15 10 21 25 31 30~ 76~ 
4 12 8 11 24 25 49 21~ 80 
5 9 17 10 22 27 37 26~ 85 
6 t4 14 9 22 25 39 31~ 84 
7 13 20 19 20 25 33 45 97 
8 10 18 10 20 24 28~ ~ 82 
9 4 18 1t 23 23 35 79 
10 10 10 19 20 27 47 28~ 86 
Medium 11 2 15 14 21 19 16~ 35~ 71 
(1.0) 12 9 14 9 18 19 23 37~ 69 
13 11 I5 1l 12 I9 2 3 j  30 68 
14 14 9 16 10 20 30~ 23~ 69 
15 0 16 9 19 22 22 26 66 
16 2 19 t6 9 19 21 26 65 
1 7 1 2 1 3 t 0 1 6 2 1 2 5 3 7 ~ 7 ~  
18 0 7 11 21 20 18~ 20 5 
19 21 15 17 i0 20 27 36~ ~3~ 
20 8 9 14 16 22 38~ 23~ 69 
Low 2 1 0 7  10 19 18 7 28~ 54 
(0.5) 22 2 0 20 20 15 20 ~ 57 / 
23 24 18 2 15 16 16__ 75~ 
24 15 9 9 14 10 23V 24 55 
25 0 1 0 2 5  18 11 11 i i ~  64 
26 0 0 18 9 18 18 45 
27 9 0 27 10 18 8 64 
28 0 17 2 24 t3 19 13 56 
29 16 8 12 14 10 26~ 24 60 
30 14 9 14 7 10 18 22 54 
Percen~ge co~ectly phced into 
H~h, Medium, Lowthkds: 73.3% 33% 86.7% 
aStudy No. 1, contributed by Moffett (1974). The text describes the conditions. 
Checks G/) indicate subjects incorrectly ordered by theoretically deduced and simu- 
lated time spent. Times for 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5 were computed to allow comparison 
with Reitman and Atkinson's (1958) results concerning predictive validity with a 
behavioral criterion. Alpha computed before rounding figures for table. 








1 . 0 0  - 
. 90  _ 
. 8 0  - 
. 7 0  - 
. 6 0  - 
5 0  - 
4 0  - 
. 30  - 
. 20  - -  
. 1 0  - -  
I | ' !  ................... ! .................. ~ .......... I I I ! I I 
. 20  - 1 0  . 0 0  A 0  2 0  . 30  . 4 0  5 0  . 6 0  . 70  . 8 0  9 0  1 . 0 0  
C R O N B A C H ' S  A L P H A  ( (~ ) 
Fig. 4. Relationship of construct validity and internal consistency (c0 in 25 simulations of TAT 
varying design and paramete r values. (Construct validity refers to the percentage of subjects 
correctly placed by total time in achievement activity into rank-ordered thirds of true motive 
strength defined by computer input,) 
spent achieving, as first noted in Atkinson (1950) and emphasized by 
Reitman and Atkinson (1958); stories early in the series have greater validity 
than those later in the series, a point documented with a behavioral criterion 
by Reitman and Atkinson (1958); the more strongly cued pictures (i.e., 
those producing relatively stronger instigating force to achieve) produce 
more time spent in achievement activity than tess strongly cued pictures. 
Since this pioneer effort, we have run a total of 25 simulations varying 
certain parameters of  the theory known as initiation and cessation lag in 
consummatory force, selective attention, and consummatory value of the 
critical activity in response to different pictures. The overall summary of  
our effort covering a variety of conditions is clearly indicated in Figure 4. It 
shows the relationship between Cronbach's e~, based on time spent thinking 
achievement in response to each picture, and construct validity, based 
Computer Simulation 15 
simply on the percentage of  subjects correctly placed into thirds (as defined 
by the input motive strength) according to the true or theoretically deduced 
total time spent thinking about achievement in the simulated test as a whole. 
The samples of  hypothetical subjects were 18, 24, or 30, depending upon 
requirements of  the study. 
In 19 instances, the construct validity is 85% correctly ordered or 
better (when by chance one expects 33%), while a varies from .08 to i .00. In 
five cases, the construct validity is 78°70 to 85%, again with a ranging from 
08 to .90. Within this set of  24 simulations, the product moment correla- 
tion between positive internal consistency coefficients and construct validity 
is .49, not the traditionally expected 1.00. In only one instance in the 25 
simulations of  a TAT test of  achievement motive does the truly expected 
construct validity really seem quite modest, only 60% correct placement 
into thirds (as compared with chance expectation of  33%). And this occurs 
when the value of  Cronbach's a is - .18!  
Our specific conclusion is that construct validity does not require 
internal consistency reliabifity. More generally, we are now prepared to 
argue, with a firm theoretical foundation, that misleading myths o f  mea- 
surement need to be identified and recognized as such, and not repeatedly 
taught as doctrine to students who lack theoretical sophistication. 
A DESCRIPTIVE REVIEW OF SIMULATION STUDIES 
Table III shows, for 25 simulations of  measurement of  TAT n 
Achievement, two indices of  construct validity (e.g., the degree to which the 
theoretically deduced time spent in the critical imaginative activity correctly 
identified the motive strength of the hypothetical subjects) and the coeffi- 
cient of  internal consistency reliability, a, based on theoretically deduced 
time spent in the critical activity in each of  five or six stories (by picture), 
depending on the design. Also listed are two of  the several parameters of  the 
theory shown to affect internal consistency, viz., selective attention, dura- 
tion of  consummatory lag, and o of  the ogivelike function for consumma- 
tory lag. The latter (not shown) defines the rate at which the full consum- 
matory force will come on or go off,  respectively, at the initiation and 
cessation of  an activity during the interval. Finally, Table III shows the per- 
centage of  total time (100 units per story) in which the tendency for ex- 
pression of  the critical motive was dominant during the test as a whole. This 
might be taken as an indicator of  what, in the empirical literature on TAT,  
is called a strongly cued picture (i.e., one that produces a high average n 
Achievement score) or a weakly cued picture (i.e., one that produces a low 
average n Achievement score). Haber and Alpert (1958), for example, 
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Table I11, Summary of Major Parameters of Interest Allowing Comparison of In- 
ternal Consistency and Construct Validity in 25 Computer Simulations of Thematic 
Apperceptive Measurement of n Achievement with Pictures in Latin Square Design 
or Fixed Order of Presentation 
Construct validity 
Simulation Selective Lag % time 
No. attention a interval spent a % correct b Pearsonr c 
Latin square designs 
1 .5 10 14,2 .078 86.7 .854 
2 1.0 1 10,5 .888 100.0 .995 
2B 1.0 1 11.7 .825 100.0 .981 
3 1.0 1 35.3 .981 100.0 .992 
13 .5 10 13.5 .183 80.0 .895 
14 .5 5 12.0 .751 93.3 .963 
15 .75 5 14,2 .267 100.0 .934 
16 .75 10 15.3 .067 86.7 .903 
21 .5 7.5 12.6 ,355 93.3 .928 
22 1.0 5 14,9 .086 80.0 .852 
23 1.0 10 1.6.9 - .182  60.0 .691 
Fixed order of presentation 
4 1.0 1 37.3 .967 100.0 .998 
5 1.0 1 38,1 .903 100.0 .997 
6 1.0 1 36.8 .949 100.0 .998 
7 1.0 5 33.1 .942 88.9 .996 
8 1.0 10 32.3 .883 77.8 .986 
8B 1.0 10 35.6 .821 83.3 .976 
9 .5 1 38.7 .910 100.0 .996 
11 .5 10 35.1 .89 88.9 .987 
l iB  .5 10 39.1 .730 91,7 .983 
17 .5 10 39.0 .869 100,0 ,994 
18 .5 10 27.3 .652 83.3 ,962 
t9 .5 10 40.1 ,857 91.7 .991 
20 .5 10 25.3 .843 91.7 .989 
24 .5 10 t4.9 .705 75.0 .955 
apercentage time subject is exposed to forces influencing subordinate tendencies. 
bpercentage correctly ordered by total time spent achieving into High, Mid, and 
Low thirds on strength of motive defined by computer input. 
eCorrelations between total time spent achieving and actual magnitude of motive 
strength in computer input (number of subjects, 18-30).  
r e p o r t e d  m o r e  r e l i a b l e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  r e s p o n s e s  
t o  s t r o n g l y  t h a n  t o  w e a k l y  c u e d  p i c t u r e s .  3 
I n  o u r  i n i t i a l  s i m u l a t i o n  s t u d y  ( N o .  1, c o n d u c t e d  b y  M a r y  M .  
M o f f e t t ) ,  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s  w as  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t w o  p r i m a r y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  we  a l r e a d y  h a d  s p e n t  a c o u p l e  o f  yea r s  e x p l o r i n g  t h e  
~The latter were found to be substantially more sensitive to prior experimental arousal of 
motivation, another fact that can be reconciled with the principles of the dynamics of action 
and results of computer simulation, but not of immediate interest. 
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effects of certain critical variables of the theory and had established certain 
conventions and guidelines concerning magnitudes for certain parameters 
(Seltzer, 1973; Atkinson & Birch, 1974; Birch et al., 1974). Second, our aim 
was quite explicitly to determine, by simple trial and check, whether or not 
it would be possible to produce a demonstration of the logical possibility of 
very substantial construct validity despite very low internal consistency 
reliability, given the principles of  the dynamics o f  action as the explanation 
o f  the content o f  the stream o f  operant imaginative behavior. 
In a preliminary simulation (not listed here) with a particular Latin 
Square involving five pictures, five sequences, and therefore 15 subjects, 
one designated High, Mid, and Low in achievement motive in each 
sequence, the magnitudes for strengths of motive (M) were arbitrarily 
selected as 3, 2, and 1. The incentive values of five pictures designated A, B, 
C, D, and E were, respectively, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8. The product of motive (in 
the person) and incentive (in the picture) yielded instigating forces to 
achieve ranging in magnitude from 2 to 24, each of which was pitted against 
instigating forces for three incompatible activities, each having a magnitude 
of 12 in response to the various pictures. Coefficient c~ was .42 (N = 15). 
The ordinal position effect for the five subjects classified Low (i.e., M 
= 1) showed the odd-even oscillation or "sawtooth" effect first noted by 
Atkinson (1950) and given some emphasis by Reitman and Atkinson (1958, 
p. 665). Here was evidence of something already familiar yet perplexing. 
Deliberately seeking to lower a, we decided to follow the lead of what 
looked familiar, so we made a change in the parameters. The motive 
strengths for High, Mid, and Low groups now became 1.5, 1.0, and 0.5 
(half their original magnitudes), and Moffett felt it imperative to achieve a 
balanced Latin Square design, one in which each picture follows every other 
picture an equal number of times, Each of the ten new sequences of five 
pictures, shown in Table IV, was presented to three hypothetical subjects 
differing, as mentioned, in strength of motive. Cronbach's a, which 
describes the average of all possible split-half reliabilities, was calculated 
from printouts showing simulated time spent "achieving" by the 30 
subjects on each picture (see, again, Table II). This yielded what we were 
looking for, an ~ = .08 (N = 30), yet with 86.7% of the subjects correctly 
placed into thirds by total score (following the simple kind of trichotomiza- 
tion of the distribution recommended in reseach with n Achievement scores 
in the mainstream of the work, e.g., McClelland et al., 1953, pp. 187-194). 
Within the framework of this same balanced Latin Square design, we 
then proceeded to determine the effect of certain variations. In Study No. 2 
(as listed in Table III), we sought to approximate the ideal case of a 
sequence of changes in activity as summarized in the mathematical principle 
of a change in activity by minimizing the effect of the consummatory lag 
interval. It was set at 1 (instead of 10 time units) and a a o f  .8 was chosen for 
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Table IV. Ten Sequences of Pictures (A to E) 
in Balanced Latin Square Design (Study No. t) 
Also Employed in Subsequent Simulations 
Using This Design (N = 30) 
Serial order of pictures 
Subject No. 1 2 3 4 5 
1 A B E C D 
2 B C A D E 
3 C D B E A 
4 D E C A B 
5 E A D B C 
6 A E B D C 
7 B A C E D 
8 C B D A E 
9 D C E B A 
10 E D A C B 
Achievement incentive value 
in Study No. 1 
A B C D E 
2 3 4 6 8 
the ogive instead of .4. Furthermore,  we made no assumption of differen- 
tial or selective attention to cues instigating the dominant  and subordinate 
tendencies. Thus, the magnitude of selective attention, which is always 1.00 
for the force influencing ongoing activity, was now set at 1.00 for the three 
competing alternatives as well. Now a = .89 and the percentage correct 
placement, in terms of  total time scores (construct validity), was 100%. 
In both simulations No. 1 and No. 2, the percentage of  500 units o f  
time spent thinking about  achievement was low, 14.2% and 10.5%, respec- 
tively. In simulation No. 3, the strength of  each of the three alternative 
instigating forces for activities x, y, and z was reduced f rom 12 to 2.5. This 
has an effect equivalent to greatly strengthening the relative achievement 
cue strength of  all pictures. Now the percentage of t ime spent thinking of 
achieving increased to 35.3%, and oe increased f rom .89 to .98. 
We felt it to be a more realistic approximation of the ambiguity of  the 
so-called projective test situation when the percentage time spent in the 
critical activity was lower, as in simulations No.  1 and No.  2, so we restored 
the magnitude of  forces for each of  the alternative activities x, y, z to 12 for 
all subsequent simulations in the balanced Latin Square designs. 
In simulation No. 2B, we replicated No. 2 (the "ideal  case"),  but 
changed the o f rom .8 to .4 so it would correspond to that of  No. 1. The 
effect on a and construct validity was minimal. 
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Simulation No. t3 was a replication of  No. 1 with one minor excep- 
tion that had already been introduced from No. 2 onward as a simplifica- 
tion. The consummatory value of  all activities (c) was set at .08 instead of  
.0833 as in No. 1. The effect of  this small change was minor, a = .18 (N = 
30) instead of  .08, and the percentage correct placement based on total time 
score dropped from 86.7070 (in No. 1) to 80070 (in No. 13). 
The effects of  our subsequent efforts systematically to vary selective 
attention and the duration of  the consummatory lag are summarized in 
Figure 5. It is obvious that when ongoing activity (whatever it is) is favored 
by greater attention to cues relevant to it, and therefore more systematic 
exposure to its instigating force than to the forces of subordinate competi- 
tors, there is greater internal consistency. Thus, when the lag is constant at 
5.0, a = .75 when subjects are exposed only half  as often (SEL = 0.5) to 
instigating forces influencing the subordinate tendencies for competing 
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Fig. 5. Effects of  durat ion o f  consummatory  lags (~ = .4) and selective attention on internal 
consistency (a) of  t ime spent achieving in simulations employing Latin Square designs. (Points 
are identified by study number  in Table III. For each of  three alternatives, F = 12, c = .08, 
a = .4). 
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activity is equivalent to that of the dominant ongoing activity (SEL = 1.0), 
drops to .09. 
It is also obvious that the longer the temporal interval of the consum- 
matory lag (1.0, 5.0, 7.5, or 10.0), the lower the internal consistency reli- 
ability, as indicated by a.  The combination of the extremes of both 
parameters, in simulation No. 23, produced o~ = - .  18 (N = 30), yet 60°70 of 
the hypothetical subjects were still correctly ordered according to their 
motive strength in terms of the truly expected total score. The product 
moment correlation indicating construct validity in this case (No. 23) was 
.69 (N = 30). 
Also identified in Figure 5 are points for simulations No. 3 and No. 2, 
which, when compared, show the effect of strong vs. weak cues for the 
critical variable. And simulation No. 2 in relation to No. 2B shows the 
effect of  a o for the ogive dr/ring the lag of  .8 vs. .4.  The point marked No. 1 
near No. 16 shows the result of  No. 1 (by Moffett) with e = .0833 instead of  
c = .08 and other differences (Table III). 
So much for the Latin Square designs patterned after Atkinson 
(1950). Table III shows comparable simulations when the design involves a 
fixed order of presentation of pictures to all the hypothetical subjects. This 
corresponds closely, in terms of ordinal cue strength of six pictures, to the 
pattern established by Haber and Alpert's (1958) early empirical study of  
reliability. 
In simulations No. 4 and No. 5, there were three magnitudes of 
achievement motive (.5, 1.0, and 1.5 in No. 4; .8, 1.0, and 1.2 in No. 5). 
There were six subjects of each type who differed in the permutations of  
strength of other motives (x, y, z) within the constraints: (1) that total 
strength of all motives of a subject always equaled 4; and (2) that the incen- 
tive values of pictures for x, y, and z had magnitudes of 1, 2, and 3, but 
varied from picture to picture. The impact of selective attention and con- 
summatory lag was minimized. In both cases, internal consistency and 
construct validity are both very high. 
In simulations No. 6, No. 7, and No. 8, all parameters were the same 
as in No. 5 except that now, in each case, the strength of achievement 
motive for each subject was based on random selection from a normal dis- 
tribution. The respective sample means were .961, .886, .898; respective 
standard deviations were .266, .215, .226. The effect of  increasing consum- 
matory tag (o of ogive constant at .8) appears to be some reduction in both 
internal consistency and construct validity. 
in simulation No. 9, the same procedure is employed (mean achieve- 
ment motive is .919, SD = .227), but selectivity of attention (0.5) is intro- 
duced. The effect is minimal. 
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The procedure in simulation No. t 1 follows that in No. 9, but the con- 
summatory  lag is increased f rom 1 to 10 units of  time. Again, very little 
effect is evident. 
In simulation No. 8B, all procedures and parameters correspond to 
No. 8 except that N is increased f rom 18 to 24 (mean motive strength = 
1.031, S D  = .171). The same randomly selected initial strengths of  
tendencies of  No. 8 are employed in this and subsequent studies. Simulation 
No. 11B corresponds in all respects (mean motive strength = 1.031, S D  = 
• 171), but selectivity in attention is changed f rom 1 in No. 8B to 0.5 in No. 
11B and a drops f rom .82 to .73. 
Perhaps the most  interesting results are obtained by comparing simu- 
lations No. 17, No. 20, and No. 24, each involving N = 24 and a 12-picture 
TAT,  a simple repetition of  the order of  six pictures differing in achieve- 
ment incentive values, as established in No. 4 (i.e., 2 6 4 1 8 3 2 6 4 1 8 3). 
Here we return to the parameter  values for selective attention (0.5) and lag 
interval (10) and o (0.4) o f  No. 13, our standard experiment in the Latin 
Square designs. The results for this set of  three are described in Table V. 
Here, with both selectivity in attention and consummatory  lag having the 
kinds of  effects we have tended to assume they do have on the stream of  
behavior, we have done the equivalent o f  changing the overall cue strength 
for achievement of  the test as a whole by varying the strength of  the 
competing tendencies. In simulation No. 17, the incentive values o f  pictures 
for the three alternative activities (x, y, and z) have magnitudes of  1, 2, and 
3, varying f rom one picture to the next for a set of  six pictures and then re- 
peated. In No. 20, these competing incentives are doubled (2, 4, 6). In No. 
24, they are quadrupled (4, 8, 12). 
Table V. Effect of Varying the Incentive Values of Pictures for Alternative 
Activities x, y, and z on Percentage of Total Time Spent in Achievement 
Activity, Construct Validity, and Internal Consistency 
Simulation Stor ies  Incentives % time % correct 
Study No. considered for x, y, z spent aclfieving a placement 
17 1-12 I, 2, or 3 39.0 .87 100.00 
1-6 39.1 .68 91.7 
7-12 38.9 .76 91.7 
20 1- t2  2, 4, or 6 25.3 .84 91.7 
1-6 25.5 .69 91.7 
7-12 25.2 .66 83.3 
24 1-12 4, 8, or 12 14.9 .71 75.0 
1-6 14.5 .35 75.0 
7-12 15.3 .52 41.7 
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The major effect of  this diminution in the relative cue strength of  
pictures for achievement is an orderly reduction in the percentage of  total 
time spent "thinking about achievement" from 39°70 to about 15%. And 
corresponding to this reduction in percentage of time spent in the critical 
activity (now down to what it was in the Latin Square designs) is a reduction 
in a from .87 to .71 when based on all 12 pictures, and from .68 to .35 when 
based only on the first six pictures. The latter corresponds more closely to 
the typical TAT used to measure individual differences in empirical 
research. Nevertheless, the percentage of  persons correctly placed into 
thirds on the basis of  total time for the test as a whole never falls below 75% 
for the first six pictures. It does, however, fall as low as 41.7°70 for the 
second six pictures in No. 24, perhaps a simulated confirmation of  an 
early report by Reitman and Atkinson (1958) that in sets o f  eight pictures, a 
n Achievement score based on the first four pictures, but not the last four, 
had predictive validity when n Achievement was related to a behavioral cri- 
terion, viz., level of  arithmetic performance of  men working alone in a 
room. 
THE COMMON FACTOR AFFECTING DEGREE 
OF INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
It is premature to attempt a very comprehensive discussion of  how the 
several assumptions that constitute traditional test theory differ from those 
that constitute the theory of  motivation applied here to thematic appercep- 
tion. One simple point can be made to spark some critical discussion. 
Traditional test theory treats each story written in response to a picture as if 
it were a separate test of  a person's motive to achieve (e.g., Entwistle, 1972) 
and assumes that the obtained n Achievement score on each test will equal 
the " t rue  score" _+ error. Furthermore, the errors across test items are 
assumed to be independent, identically and normally distributed, with mean 
zero. Each test is treated as an isolated incident in the life o f  the person. 
In contrast, the dynamics of  action emphasizes the streamlike charac- 
ter of  behavior--change in behavior yet continuity (i.e., persistence) of  the 
underlying motivational structure from one incident to the next. If the 
initial strengths of  various competing motivational tendencies are not the 
same at the beginning of  each incident (e.g., the presentation of  a picture), 
the true score, i.e., the theoretically-deduced time spent thinking about 
achievement, is not expected to be constant f rom one picture to the next. 
That, in effect, is what these simulations have been about. 
One might guess, and we did, that any factor that would increase the 
range of  differences among competing motivational tendencies at the 
moment a TAT picture (the stimulus) is presented would lower the internal 
consistency (a) of the test as a whole. Why? Because sometimes the 
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tendency of critical interest (in this case, tendency to achieve) would be the 
strongest of the competitors, but sometimes it would be the weakest. If 
there were no variation in the initial (or inertial) strengths of competing ten- 
dencies carried over from the preceding moment, then strength of insti- 
gating forces (motives) alone would determine the latency and duration of 
the critical activity in response to each picture. 
Figure 6 shows that our guess, the kind of unconscious inference one 
begins to make when acquainted with the logic of a theory, is correct. For 
each of 20 simulations having different designs and parameter values, we 
calculated the range between the strongest and weakest tendency for each 
subject, and the mean for all subjects in that simulation immediately prior 
to presentation of picture C in Latin Square designs, and before the third 
picture when there was a single or fixed order of presentation. In each case, 
the magnitude of the incentive to achieve of the critical picture was 4 for the 
average subject. One can see (in Figure 6) that a decreases as the mean range 
of the initial strengths of four competing motivational tendencies increases. 
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Fig. 6. Effect on internal consistency (a) of  mean  range in strength o f  action tendencies im- 
mediately prior to exposure to critical picture computed after 20 TAT simulations (r = - .96) .  
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The product moment correlation between magnitude of c~ and mean ten- 
dency range is - .96 (N = 20). The mean range in strength of tendencies is 
consistently smaller when we are dealing with the third picture in a fixed 
order than the same picture in Latin Square designs, where it is preceded by 
a different sequence of events for different subjects. I f  the several tests 
defined by presentation o f  a picture are independent incidents (as presumed 
by traditional test theory), shouM it make any difference where a particular 
picture occurs in the sequence? 
THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND MEASUREMENT THEORY 
The theory of motivation specifies how a stable personality disposi- 
tion, strength of motive, will be expressed behaviorally in variable amounts 
of time spent thinking and/or writing about achievement. It tells us specifi- 
cally how, under various conditions, the "truly expected" time spent 
expressing the tendency to achieve will vary in a sequence of consecutive 
incidents. From our computer simulations, we conclude that the "truly 
expected" construct validity of a TAT test can be substantially high even 
when the "truly expected" internal consistency is nil! 
Basic theory about the underlying psychological process is logically 
prior to any application of traditional test theory. One must, in other words, 
have some sound theoretical basis for expecting a certain "true score" on a 
given test before one introduces the whole logic of test theory, which has to 
do with the implications of random error in the effort to measure 
accurately. With thematic apperception, it has been a mistake to assume 
that the "true score" (some behavioral manifestation) should be constant 
just because the strength of the underlying trait (motive) is presumed 
constant. One needs a theory to get from personality to something mea- 
surable, viz., behavior. 
In the present context, traditional test theory becomes a useful 
conceptual tool in getting to and from these theoretically deduced (and 
simulated) times spent thinking about achievement as we imagine them 
measured by a perfect clock to the fallible empirical index called n Achieve- 
ment score. How good a clock is that 25-year-old experimentally validated 
and obviously heuristic index (McClelland, Clark, Roby, & Atkinson, 1949) 
when calculated by someone whose coding reliability is .95? Or only .70? 
Quite obviously, the very modest indices of internal consistency noted or 
estimated by constant critics of TAT methodology (e.g., an o~ around .30 
to .40 estimated by Entwistle, 1972) must be degraded versions of some 
higher theoretically expected value of a. But that truly expected o~ is not 
necessarily 1.00 or very near to it. 
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In suggesting this relationship between basic psychological theory and 
traditional test theory, let us not lose sight of the main point and conclu- 
sion. It is erroneous to conclude that a thematic apperceptive test lacks 
validity as a measure o f  individual differences in strength o f  achievement 
motive because internal consistency is low. We have demonstrated the 
logical possibility of substantial construct validity even when there is no 
internal consistency reliability. The point has been made repeatedly in 
empirical research with TAT n Achievement since 1949, which yielded the 
general theory of motivation now turned on the TAT itself. 
According to the dynamics of action, one shouM expect high internal 
consistency reliability, as measured by a, when a person is engaged in one 
particular activity for  a substantial length o f  time (as, for example, when 
taking a 20-minute arithmetic test, or when trying to present an accurate 
picture of oneself in response to the structured items of a long objective 
test), or when constantly engaged in the task o f  writing imaginative stories 
for  32 minutes without interruption. According to the theory of motivation, 
the strength of a tendency should move toward its limit and become 
essentially stable when a given activity continues for a period of time 
(Atkinson & Birch, 1970, p. 18; 1974, pp. 276-278). Here is a sound the- 
oretical basis for the constant true score presumed in traditional test theory. 
And we find substantial evidence in the literature of high internal consis- 
tency when the activity measured stretches uninterrupted through a period 
of time. We even have this new fact to present to illustrate the point. When 
a was recently calculated for number o f  words per story in the data of 
Atkinson's (1950) initial eight-picture Latin Square that had then been 
designed to check the reliability of TAT n Achievement, a was .96 (N = 32) 
for number o f  words. Individual differences in imaginative and verbal 
productivity were quite stable throughout the 32 minutes of writing imagin- 
ative stories. But the ~x for n Achievement score obtained from each of the 
eight pictures was lower, only .57 (N = 32), when calculated from actual 
scores of individual subjects (shown in the appendix of Atkinson, 1950), but 
not .37 as estimated by Entwistle (1972) from a later published table of cell 
means. Furthermore, the calculated a was .64 for n Achievement in six 
stories when two pictures lacking in validity were excluded now as in 1950. 
The scoring reliability was probably as high then, .95, as it ever has been? 
The difference between the internal consistency (a = .96) of imagina- 
tive-verbal productivity, which went on continuously for 32 minutes, and 
= .57 of imaginative content having to do with achievement nicely illu- 
strates the difference between engaging in a particular activity for  a period 
4See McCMland et al. (1953, Ch. 7) for further discussion of the usually overlooked evidence 
of the independence of n Achievement and length of protocol among college students. 
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of time (e.g., writing stories) and the typical change from one activity to 
another that characterizes the everyday stream of overt operant behavior 
and the content of the covert stream of imaginative thought. 
This characteristic of an individual's imaginative behavior--the 
ability of the subject to change, when so inclined, from one kind of activity 
to another, and to encompass in the stream of thought anything that one is 
inclined to think about--makes it a great resource for future development 
of social psychology. For the stream of imaginative thought now has a 
sound theoretical foundation, something it lacked a quarter of a century 
ago. This general theory of motivation, the dynamics of action, provides a 
new,. empirically grounded, conceptual scheme in terms of which to 
appraise the adequacy of the underlying premises of traditional test theory 
in the new era of behavioral science, the era of computer simulation of 
behavior. 
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